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The metaphysics of possible worlds proposed by the analytic philosopher David K. Lewis offers 
an account of fictional discourse according to which possible worlds described in fiction are just 
as real as the actual world. In an inspired reversal of the analysis of literary fictions by such 
philosophical means, the French poet Jacques Roubaud makes direct reference to Lewis’ 
controversial ontological picture in two cycles of elegies composed between 1986 and 1990. 
Roubaud’s poems take up the idea of possible worlds as real entities, and at the same time 
they challenge the notion that philosophy could offer an account of fiction in which the puzzling 
collision of the possible with the impossible that fundamentally characterizes the phenomenon 
of fictionality would be seamlessly unravelled. For Roubaud the lyrical genre of the elegy and its 
thematic concern with love and death stands as a prime indicator of the quandary that results 
from our inability to solve paradoxes of modality such as those raised by Lewis in strictly 
theoretical terms. 
 
It is no well-kept secret that substantial points of contact between contemporary 
analytic philosophy on the one side, and the domain of literature and its study on the 
other, are primarily conspicuous by their absence. While one might argue that 
permanently ongoing differentiation necessarily condemns either side to considering the 
other incommunicado, for better or worse, the descendants of Carnap and the 
practitioners of what the German academy designates as the ‘science of literature’ 
(Literaturwissenschaft) certainly entertain no straightforward relationship to science and 
the development of its disciplines. Regardless of whether theoretical enterprises such as 
the causal theory of knowledge or a strictly empirical science of literature as Siegfried J. 
Schmidt once sought to establish it may accurately be modeled on pursuits in the natural 
sciences, occasionally we do witness the emergence of a framework which—even if not 
precisely “revolutionary” in the Kuhnian sense—suggests conceptual overlap between 
disciplines that otherwise tend to go their increasingly separate ways.  
The pervasive talk of possible worlds in analytic philosophy and literary studies 
since the 1970s is one such case. While by no means deliberately conceived as an engine 
of interdisciplinarity, the adoption of the notion of possible worlds by modal logicians 
was followed by its subsequent dispersal not only to a number of other subfields in 
philosophy but also to linguistics and narratology.  Scholars of a non-analytic bent 
quickly picked up on the fact that the notion of possible worlds did not constitute a 
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radical conceptual break with the past but in fact had a far-flung intellectual ancestry in 
the writings not only of Leibniz but also of writers such as Fontenelle and the godfathers 
of German-language literary criticism, Bodmer and Breitinger.i  
Moving from the most abstract level of the theoretical invocation of an array of 
possible worlds for any number of potential theoretical objectives to the concrete 
theoretical context particularly relevant to the following reflections, the issue most 
directly linking philosophical and literary interest in possible worlds talk is its 
applicability to an analysis of the phenomenon of fictionality.  In one way or another, the 
kinds of analyses in question present fictional discourse as a linguistic domain that makes 
reference to possible worlds—worlds, that is, which are not identical to the actual 
world that surrounds us.  
From the perspective of analytic philosophy of language, theories of fiction 
modeled on possible worlds are primarily designed to resolve the puzzles presented by 
fictional discourse for a consistent account of meaning across all domains of language. 
Possible worlds talk offers the tantalizing perspective of departing from the reductive 
fixation on empirical verification that had compelled the early logical positivists to 
equate all non-literal language with nonsense—fit to express (non-theoretical) attitudes 
but not to assert statements (Carnap 78-80)—while at the same time preventing 
metaphor from sowing the seeds of radical skepticism about actuality. 
The motivation to be discerned on the other side of the coin, namely among 
scholars of literary narrative who adopt some version of the possible worlds 
framework, is to some degree convergent with this interest in preserving the integrity 
of reference. Thomas Pavel remarked well over 20 years ago that “the moratorium on 
referential issues” as an operative guideline in literary theory had become “obsolete” 
(Pavel 10), and even though he rejected the interpretation of fictional worlds as objects 
to be reduced outright to the abstract notion of possible worlds employed in modal 
logic (49), he nevertheless advocated the import of the “world” concept (back) into 
literary studies, in response to prior insistence among structuralists and post-
structuralists that hors-texte there was no such world to be found. By the very nature of 
their object of analysis, literary theorists such as Pavel and Lubomír Doležel, however, 
take a considerably wider view of reference than most analytic philosophers, one 
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according to which the primary task in evaluating a piece of fictional discourse is not in 
every instance to achieve consistency with a presumably shared sense of a common 
actual world. While he does not call the cognitive value of literary fictions into question, 
the purpose of many types of the latter, according to Pavel, “is less to increase the trade 
in conventional wisdom than to expand our perception of fictional possibilities” (Pavel 
84). Fictionality, hence, is not considered a mere obstacle potentially impeding the 
unequivocal assessment of what there actually is; its practices of referring to worlds more 
generously than may seem warranted in certain philosophical circles, Pavel argues, “are 
perceived as marginal only in contrast to some culturally determined ossification into 
normality” (27), one that by no means constitutes an absolute standard.  
Even if the narratological elaboration of making sufficiently secure reference to a 
plurality of fictional worlds does not adopt the modal-logical notion of possible worlds 
wholly as its own,ii it would seem initially plausible that the versions of possible worlds 
theory most frequently examined for its potential adaptation to literary contexts are 
those that consider possible worlds as objects that are made rather than found, as the 
result of calculated poiesis rather than the sheer luck (prompted, perhaps, by assiduous 
observation) of discovery. In the memorable formulation offered by Saul Kripke: 
“‘Possible worlds’ are stipulated, not discovered by powerful telescopes” (Kripke 44). At 
least as regards their ontological status, then, the possible worlds devised by analytic 
philosophers such as Kripke, Plantinga, Stalnaker, Rescher and others may seem 
amenable to the literary theorist focusing on fictionality in that these possible worlds are 
acknowledged to be strictly of our own making, rather than being part and parcel of any 
essential furniture of the universe. On one interpretation, they simply provide a language 
for us to talk about modality, and what could be more accommodating to the realm of 
literature than to conceive of a relation to the world—or worlds—in terms of a 
language, and a non-binding one at that? 
Pavel and Doležel have themselves remarked that the language thus offered by 
philosophy runs into a fundamental problem—which will be revisited below—when it 
attempts to account for internally contradictory fictions, and can thus not serve as a 
ready-made solution for the purposes of narrative theory. What is most striking, 
however, is that one proponent of possible worlds theory—who gets a very short 
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hearing by a number of those that would aspire to offer a theory of fictional worldsiii—
denies altogether that possible worlds are, in so many words, elements of a language, 
however technical that language may be. The philosopher in question is David K. Lewis, 
(in)famous for his vigorous challenge of the widely-held belief just reported, according 
to which possible worlds are abstract rather than concrete entities, and thus could not 
be said to exist in the same way that ‘our’ world exists. Lewis instead espouses what he 
terms modal realism, proposing that we include in our ontology not just all of that which 
is actual, but also, and in addition, everything that is possible. (In effect, ‘actual’ is here to 
be understood deictically as pointing to one among many possibilities, the one with 
which we are presumably familiar.) Equal rights of existence are thus granted to that 
which is actual and to that which is ‘only’ possible, that is: to possible worlds in which, 
counterfactually, states of affairs obtain that differ from the actualized ones. Realism 
about possible worlds asserts that the worlds in question are not mere abstract 
stipulations but exist in the modal universe as incontrovertibly as anything we might 
reach out and touch, even though—naturally—neither looking nor touching are an 
option in the case of possibilia.  
This theory deserves the moniker ‘realism’ because, put in the most basic terms, 
it insists on a reality beyond language. Modal realism proposes the view that possible 
worlds are part and parcel of our ontological furniture; they are no less real and 
concrete than the actual world before us, and like the latter they are—to the realist—
independent of any language used to refer to them. In his book On the Plurality of 
Worlds,iv Lewis from the outset rejects the idea that language could have a world-making 
hand in the creation of possibilia: “The worlds are not of our own making. . . . We make 
languages and concepts and descriptions and imaginary representations that apply to 
worlds (On the Plurality of Worlds 3).v  If possible worlds are not made by us, but 
languages and any means of representation in general are, this implies, as Lewis will point 
out later in the book, that worlds have the potential to “outrun our means of describing 
them” (165). We may well aspire to make parts of worlds—since, obviously, languages 
are part of those worlds (be these actual or possible) in which they operate—but 
according to Lewis we do not make the worlds themselves as causally isolated wholes. 
We therefore cannot principally preclude elements of possible worlds that we might not 
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be able to successfully address with the help of those parts of the same world called 
‘language,’ ‘concepts,’ or ‘representations.’  The ontology of possible worlds is so 
pluralistic that, according to Lewis, “absolutely every way that a world could possibly be 
is a way that some world is” (2)—and some of these ways just may not be amenable to 
description. 
The reason I dwell on this rather entertaining bit of metaphysical speculation is 
not to provide conclusive evidence against the death of God that has long since been 
announced, or against the diagnosis of a ‘post-metaphysical age’ delivered (though hardly 
with any Nietzschean undertones) by Jürgen Habermas. Rather, I focus on Lewis’ 
particular brand of possible worlds theory because it finds itself intertwined in an 
intriguingly complex fashion not just with literary studies but with literary text itself. 
Lewis is not only among those possible worlds theorists who have explicitly written on 
the analysis of fictional discourse; his work is also the direct point of reference in a cycle 
of poems by the contemporary French poet Jacques Roubaud that will be the object of 
my reflections below.vi  Roubaud’s poems mark the vertiginous ability of literary fiction 
read broadly (that is, not strictly confined to extended prose narrative) to re-inscribe—
or, as we might put it: to re-fictionalize—the very theory that would assign fiction a 
particular spot in its own philosophical architectonic. Literature thus enters into an 
exchange with possible worlds theory that is not predicated on a shared question to 
which alternative answers are provided (that sort of exchange tends to be confined to 
intradisciplinary contexts), but rather constitutes an altogether less predictable 
encounter.  
To wit, it is Lewis, not someone like Kripke, who is invoked as a point of literary 
reference in Roubaud’s poetry. Someone, that is, who flatly denies any role of poiesis in 
our relation to possible worlds, and, even though he avoids mention of the telescopes 
mocked by Kripke, does not rule out the possibility that fiction “might serve as the 
means for the discovery of modal truth” (Lewis, “Truth in Fiction” 278). Why would 
this type of realism that explicitly denies language and metaphor any world-making (or, 
in Kripke’s terms, stipulative) powers be of interest to a poet? In what follows, I will 
attempt to develop an answer to this question. 
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It is important to note that Lewis does not present his metaphysics of possible 
worlds as an absolute doctrine but rather as a way of doing philosophy with particular 
strategic advantages: “If we want the theoretical benefits that talk of possibilia brings,” he 
writes, “the most straightforward way to gain honest title to them is to accept such talk 
as the literal truth” (On the Plurality of Worlds 4). The “literal truth” of the language of 
possible worlds would amount to saying that these worlds are not metaphorical realms 
in which we indulge at our leisure, or which are invoked in a dissimulative effort. For 
Lewis, there is something potentially dishonest about metaphor: its capacity to disguise 
would let us refer to an extraordinary number of new entities in order to solve a 
number of theoretical impasses without implying any clear commitment to the status of 
the entities thus invoked. In this particular respect, Lewis takes the call of his teacher 
Quine for ontological commitment (Quine 12) seriously, even though he radically 
rejects Quine’s notion that such seriousness obliges one to be as ontologically 
parsimonious as possible. Lewis’ interest in gaining “honest title” to the benefits of the 
theory he proposes means to follow them to their necessary conclusion even if that 
conclusion should seem strongly counterintuitive, which indeed it has to those on 
whose faces Lewis’ theory has met with what he himself dubbed the “incredulous stare” 
(On the Plurality of Worlds 133-35). 
While the intuitively scandalous ‘cost’ of an immense ontology of concrete 
possible worlds has been the primary bone of contention for the majority of Lewis’ 
fellow analytic philosophers as well as for a number of narrative theorists, it is, arguably, 
the very prospect of such non-abstract plurality which makes Lewis’ theory into a 
suitable poetic conduit for Roubaud. The theoretical benefits due him for his 
adventurous ontological commitment are, to be sure, of little import to the poet. He, 
too, calculates, but to different ends. Lewis, for his part, is led to assume that the theory 
he is proposing is true (while explicitly acknowledging that he is not aspiring to deliver 
conclusive proof) precisely because modal realism is “fruitful” (4); that is, it allows for 
systematically integrated answers to a whole range of interrelated philosophical 
problems such as the analysis of modality, causation, belief, and object properties. While 
the handy dispatching of long standing philosophical quandaries may be of no direct 
concern to the poet, modal realism will still bear fruit for his work. The process of 
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grafting the former onto the latter, however, produces a decidedly different sort of 
yield. 
In order to appreciate, rather than minimize, that difference, it behooves us first 
to consider in some more detail the theory of fiction developed by Lewis as part of the 
framework of modal realism. If the point of the latter is to establish and defend the 
literal truth of possible worlds talk, which role may any consideration of the non-literal 
play? The connection between both domains, so much is clear, is not one of simple 
equivalence for Lewis. In an extension of the aforementioned claim that worlds are not 
dependent on languages or other forms of representation, he insists that worlds are also 
nothing like stories or story-tellers (7). The reason that they are not is, once again, 
because possible worlds may well exceed that which stories, or their tellers, may be in a 
position to tell about them. Many fictions, so the argument goes, present only a tiny 
subset of the states of affairs that by logical implication may be considered to hold true 
in the worlds in which the fictions in question are set. At least as importantly, the non-
narrative nature of Lewis’ worlds keeps them from the threat of internal 
contradictoriness. Stories, or storytellers, may contradict themselves, while 
contradictions cannot be true in any one given world considered as a whole. Thus, one 
crucial task of the array of indeterminately many possible worlds is to theoretically 
accommodate what would otherwise be strict contradictions in one and the same 
world. 
The claim that worlds are not themselves stories or storytellers does not mean 
that stories or storytelling are completely outside the realm of interest of the modal 
realist; the literal-ness of the language of possible worlds by no means precludes fiction. 
Fictional discourse enters the picture not as the embodiment of a world, but as one way 
of referring to worlds. In his seminal article “Truth in Fiction,” Lewis seeks to give an 
analysis of fictional discourse that would preserve a notion of truth governing its 
contents that remains consistent with the acknowledgement that, by definition, fiction is 
not committed to limiting its scope of reference to the actual world. Truth in fiction is 
here characterized as a restricted universal quantifier over possible worlds that allows 
closure under implication—which means, among other things, that fictional truth is not 
cut off from consequences it ought to imply under the law of non-contradiction. Leaving 
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aside some of the more technical aspects of Lewis’ analysis that are not of immediate 
concern here, the following applies for one of Lewis’ main examples in this article, 
Conan Doyle’s character Sherlock Holmes: the fictional claim that Holmes lived at 221B 
Baker Street—not true in the actual world, in which reportedly a bank building once 
stood at that London address—is true in any possible world where it is told as known 
fact that Holmes lived at that address, where it is true that he did live there, and which 
on the whole differs less from the collective belief world (the problematic assessment of 
which I will here factor out) than any world in which Holmes did not live at that 
address. 
What is of particular interest about this analysis is the fundamental thrust of 
Lewis’ view of fiction in its relationship to ‘our world,’ as he frequently calls the one 
possible world—actualized as it is—that surrounds us. The preservation of the kind of 
non-contradictoriness that Lewis cites in his rejection of the view of worlds themselves 
as stories or storytellers emerges as a key motivation here. In contradistinction to 
worlds, stories—or fiction, or literature tout court—can be contradictory. Over the 
course of the Sherlock Holmes stories, for example, as Lewis points out, Doyle located 
Watson’s old war wound in different places, thereby creating internal contradictions 
that may be smoothed out via an analysis in terms of possible worlds that confines an 
inconsistency of this kind to a very small part of the worlds that contain Watson, 
presumably preventing “that just anything is true in the Holmes stories” (Lewis, “Truth 
in Fiction” 275).  
Lewis’ eccentrically rich ontology thus seems designed to establish a sense of 
logical neighborliness between our world and worlds portrayed in literature. Readers, 
he suggests in strictly hermeneutic spirit, look to “the least disruptive way of making [a 
given] supposition true” (269), and they are engaged in a “cooperative game of make-
believe” in which information from several sources is combined, in the basic manner of 
historiography, to establish consistency regarding any states of affairs in the background 
of a given piece of literature that are not detailed explicitly in the story (276). What 
readers end up with in this benevolent scenario is not merely one world in which a 
particular fiction takes place and on the features of which we must necessarily agree, but 
instead a certain array of relevant possible worlds not too far removed from each other 
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with respect to their ontological layout. We are relieved—or so Lewis contends—from 
having to contemplate one world in which 221B Baker Street was both a bank and the 
residence of a famous detective, or in which Watson’s single wound is found in his left 
leg and his right arm simultaneously. Instead, we are invited to contemplate several 
worlds where either of these things are true but not both, some of which will differ in 
no other ways from each other, and in limited ways from our own.vii These worlds will 
be—and this is crucial for our present considerations—radically separate from each 
other, no matter how closely their make-up resembles other nearby worlds. They 
remain absolutely inaccessible to each other, and even though they all exist—given that 
Lewis adamantly rejects the Meinongian notion of non-existent objects—they exist 
strictly in each other’s absence.  
 
One literary form which by its very definition deals with such absence is the 
lyrical genre of the elegy. Two poetry volumes by Jacques Roubaud, Quelque chose noir 
(translated into English as Some Thing Black) (1986) and La pluralité des mondes de Lewis 
(translated as The Plurality of Worlds of Lewis) (1991), may be said to belong to this 
genre.viii The first of these two books constituted Roubaud’s return to poetry after a 
period of silence of several years following the death of his second wife, Alix Cléo 
Roubaud, from pulmonary embolism at the age of 31 in 1983. While this biographical 
point of reference is palpable throughout these two cycles of poems, it introduces itself 
subtly because it is modulated by a strict attention to form, and is cast in a lyrical tone 
that is in many ways the exact opposite of the emphatic invocation that a reader familiar 
with earlier specimens of the genre might expect. Modern elegy, as Jahan Ramazani has 
emphasized, routinely presents “not so much solace as fractured speech, not so much 
answers as memorable puzzlings” (ix). Finding oneself confronted with what is puzzling 
leaves little space for the direct emotional charge of classical elegies, which prompts 
Ramazani to conclude that elegy in modernity tends to take on an anti-elegiac character. 
Whether or not we commit to regarding this as a strict reversal in generic terms, 
Roubaud, for his part, sees the confrontation of philosophical puzzles as part and parcel 
of the situation in which the mourning lyrical I finds itself.  
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The adoption of Ludwig Wittgenstein as an implicit interlocutor in Quelque chose 
noir is directly related to the formal constraints derived from correspondences to the 
object of the elegies. Alix Cléo was not only an accomplished photographer but also—as 
we know from her diary that was posthumously edited by Roubaud—working on a 
study of Wittgenstein’s theory of the image that never saw completion. I have described 
elsewhere how Roubaud, as he seeks a poetic language of mourning that incorporates 
elements of the one whose absence is being mourned, characterizes the search for such 
a language by distinguishing it from the Wittgensteinian theory of language games 
according to which even the specter of death—figured in the poem “Méditation de la 
certitude” as a contemplation of the hand of the corpse—might be subject to doubt and 
reinterpretation.ix The lyrical I insists here that  
aucun jeu de langage ne pouvait déplacer cette certitude. ta main pendait au 
bord du lit. 
 
(“Méditation de la certitude,” Quelque chose noir 13) 
 
 
no language game could budge this certainty. your hand hung down from the 
bed.  
 
(“Mediation on Certitude,” Some Thing Black 11) 
 
Yet, inscribing the visual perception into the poem by putting it into a relation of 
resemblance to Wittgenstein’s invocation of G.E. Moore’s emphatically raised hand(s)x 
begins to unsettle the alleged certitude claimed against a view of language known for its 
responsiveness to the context of any utterance. 
The third section of Quelque chose noir includes not only a direct reference to 
Wittgenstein’s name in the title of a poem (45) but also calls up a philosophical point of 
view that finds itself at some remove from Wittgenstein’s perspective on a world as a 
singular entity of which both the work of art and thought, as he at one time speculated, 
might offer “the right perspective.”xi In the consecutive poems “Roman-photo” and 
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“Roman, II,” the lyrical I thus shifts to the perspective of (a) hypothetical novel(s) 
presenting possible worlds in which the lyrical I (“Il y a quelqu’un, un homme. Il n’est pas 
nommé.”) and the mourned other (“Il a sa jeune femme, qui est morte.”) find 
themselves in different circumstances, including worlds where her death—
counterfactually—has not taken place. The representation of these possibilities is 
articulated not just in the language of fiction—given that the lyrical I of any poem is 
never simply a truth-telling extension of the author—but in the fiction of fiction. The 
lyrical I in the poem contemplates the possibility of a novel in which the life of an 
unnamed man plays out within a modal realm different both from that of the enveloping 
lyrical frame and, likewise, of the frame that comprises the lyrical I’s author, one 
“Jacques Roubaud.” The following poem, “Roman, II,” pushes the incompatibility 
between these realms to the point of imagining a novel (“un autre roman encore, peut-
être le même”) in which the man receives a phone call from his dead wife. What would 
this man do in that case?  
Il décrochera, et il entendra sa voix. Le monde où il est encore (le téléphone 
vient de sonner mais il n’a pas encore bougé la main pour répondre) sera 
oublié.  
 
      (“Roman, II,” Quelque chose noir 53) 
  
He will pick up the receiver and hear her voice. This world where he still is 
(the phone has rung, but he has not yet moved his hand in order to answer) 
will be forgotten. 
 
(“Novel, II,” Some Thing Black 51) 
 
 
In fact, as the further elaboration of the situation in the poem shows, the world of the 
lyrical I in which the possible world of his wife’s non-death is imagined necessarily ceases 
to be possible itself if the state of affairs in the imagined world is taken as the measure 
of actuality—a world in which the lyrical I has battled for thirty months with the impact 
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of the death in question, and in which death arguably remains the limit-concept of 
experience for any human being. Given this confrontation of two incommensurable 
worlds, the telephone here cannot serve its anticipated function as a communicative 
medium. There is nothing to say to an inhabitant of a world in which that which is at the 
root of the radical separation between the two speakers simply does not apply.xii The 
struggle with death is translated into a language of fiction that is at war with itself: 
enunciating a possibility which, upon reflection, reveals itself as an impossibility, it battles 
against the very silence that the early Wittgenstein had suggested be employed outside 
the border delimiting both world and language. 
This linguistic struggle against silence continues in La pluralité des mondes de Lewis, 
with conceptual references to Wittgenstein largely replaced by those to Lewis’ modal 
realism in the first part of the book, a cycle of 30 numbered poems written between 
1987 and 1990 that bears the same title as the book itself. In a continuation of the 
elegiac invocation of the dead other, these poems expand the consideration of possible 
worlds begun in Quelque chose noir to universes shaped explicitly by Lewisian 
terminology. The indexicality of the ‘actual’ world as analyzed by Lewis makes the 
absence of the other person in the world of the poetic voice felt all the more acutely, 
while that person is simultaneously pictured—and directly addressed as ‘you’ (tu/toi)—in 
possible worlds that contain her alive, either with (as in poem [vii]) or without (as in 
poems [vi] and [xxv]) the lyrical I himself present. The addressing of ‘you’ here emerges 
as an affirmation of possibility within the parameters of Lewis’ metaphysics; everything 
that can be said is hence to be considered possible in some world, while impossibility is 
reserved for all that does not apply in any world: 
 
l’impossible, en aucun monde, n’est le cas. 
 
et dans un monde tout, toujours, n’est que possibles. 
 
aucun impossible ne peut être dit 
 
autrement, ailleurs 
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qu’en disant.                  je ne tais rien 
 
disant : ‘toi’. 
 
je ne montre rien non plus.            
 
                ([xx], “Voie de l’impossible,” La 
pluralité des mondes de Lewis 29) 
 
 
the impossible is not the case in any world. 
 
in any world all things, always, can only be possibilia. 
 
nothing impossible can be said 
 
otherwise, elsewhere 
 
except by saying.              I hold nothing back 
 
by saying: “you.” 
 
and I show nothing either    
 
   ([xx], “The Way of the Impossible,” The 
Plurality of Worlds of Lewis 30) 
 
In a loosening of the restriction that the early Wittgenstein of the Tractatus had placed 
on the contents of a singular world as equivalent to “all that is the case,” the plurality of 
worlds envisioned by Lewis does allow for speaking of that which is not actually the case. 
It allows for speaking of the possible of which the actual—as actualized possibility—is 
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but a part. But what sort of modal status should be reserved for the ‘you’ that is here 
not held back as strictly unsayable?xiii While the very enunciation of the personal 
pronoun—in an avoidance of the proper name,xiv but likewise of radical silence—
appears to indicate the possible presence of the one whom the word deictically 
denotes, the elegiac context in fact implies the very opposite; the radical discontinuity 
between the world of the mourner and the possible world of the mourned as alive (and 
hence as not-to-be-mourned) condemns the notion of address and communication to 
impossibility. And yet, as the third sentence of the quoted passage asserts with 
unavoidable ambiguity, there is no articulation of the impossible that does not 
automatically entail the creation (or, as Lewis would prefer, the identification) of 
possibilia. The emergence of such possibilia, however, does not amount to the showing of 
anything, as Wittgenstein had claimed the mystical (das Mystische) does, stepping up 
where language fails.xv As in the ekphrastic outline of the hypothetical “Photo-Novel” in 
the poem of the same name, there is nothing to see here, yet simply moving along is not 
an option. Still, tarrying (taire) in hopes of an eventual appearance of the subject 
addressed is ultimately an exercise in futility, no matter how long the wait, or the way. 
Lewis himself terms the vision of the modal realist an ontological “paradise” (On 
the Plurality of Worlds 4), a land of metaphysical plenty that he defends against those who 
would take up Occam’s razor to shave it down to a more parsimonious size, and which 
he insists cannot be had “on the cheap” by thinking of possible worlds as mere abstract 
representations that do not require ontological commitments. The provocation that 
Roubaud’s poetry discovers at the dark heart of this paradise—and the reason why the 
latter serves as an apt background for the meditations contained in these poems—is 
that the promise of possibility goes hand in hand with radically isolating each world and 
precluding access to it from any other realm.xvi As Lewis writes, “trans-world individuals 
are . . . impossible individuals” (On the Plurality of Worlds 211), which means that 
according to Lewis individuals do not retain strict identity (sometimes called this-ness, or 
quiddity) across possible worlds. This sort of identity would enable them to engage in 
transworld travel—the migration between worlds without relinquishing their identity—to 
access other possibilia while strictly remaining themselves. Lewis instead argues, in 
oftentimes very technical terms, for a counterpart theory according to which individuals 
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across possible worlds—for example, Roubaud’s lyrical I in the present situation in 
which his wife has died, and that lyrical I in a possible world in which she is still alive—
are not bound by a strict relation of identity but rather by a counterpart relation which 
lets one represent the other. Lewis explains this sort of relation with reference to a 
possible world in which Hubert Humphrey wins the presidential election (which he in 
fact lost) against Nixon in 1968:  
Humphrey may be represented in absentia in other worlds [including 
those in which he wins the 1968 election], just as he may be in museums 
in this world. The museum can have a waxwork figure to represent 
Humphrey, or better yet an animated simulacrum. Another world can do 
better still: it can have as part a Humphrey of its own, a flesh-and-blood 
counterpart of our Humphrey, a man very like Humphrey in his origins, 
in his intrinsic character, or in his historical role. By having such a part, a 
world represents de re, concerning Humphrey – that is, the Humphrey of 
our world, whom we as his worldmates may simply call Humphrey – that 
he exists and does thus-and-so. (Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds 194) 
 
The corrosive implications of such representation in absentia across possible worlds—
whether these representations be of a political representative or a deceased beloved—
are not hard to fathom. The possible existence that is held out like the Cartesian 
promise of a durably shaped piece of wax or an automaton of stunning likeness, is, in the 
end, a representation of an absence as much as a representation in absence. The radical 
difference in register that such an absence carries in the humorous example of the wax 
museum invoked by Lewis, and the deeply personal character of a tragic loss as it is 
figured in Roubaud’s poetry, respectively, constitutes a considerable challenge to our 
reading habits in both directions. Roubaud’s unconventional type of elegy forces the 
attentive reader to contemplate the referential backdrop of a philosophical discourse 
that is nowhere explicitly concerned with the possible existential weight of being 
incontrovertibly separated from one’s own counterpart or from that of a beloved dead 
other. Lewis’ system of metaphysics, on the other hand, while it owes its conception to 
strictly logical considerations, cannot fully shield itself from a reading that would ask 
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how one of its conceptual centerpieces such as the ‘counterpart’ might fare in a world 
that allowed it to be inscribed into a literary rendering of the harrowing experience of 
mourning. Roubaud takes up the latter scenario in the following lines:  
on ne passe pas d’un sous-monde à l’autre.         on ne passe pas vivant.       
ni mort. 
 
[...] 
 
(tu y mourras, moi ici) 
 
en contrepartie tu es,        tu es,        là,        encore.        C’est la seule 
consolation. je ne la nommerai pas survie.   
 
      ([xxv], “Partage de monde,” La pluralité 
des mondes de Lewis 34) 
 
 
one cannot cross from one sub-world to another,        one cannot cross 
alive.        or dead. 
 
[...] 
 
(you will die there, I here) 
 
as a counterpart you are,        are        there,        still.        It is the only 
consolation. I would not call it survival.   
 
([xxv], “Division of World,”xvii The Plurality 
of Worlds of Lewis 35) 
 
Comparable to the ambiguous existence as a paradoxical pronoun used in an address, 
being as counterpart is not nothing; it is a mode of being held out “in return” (en 
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contrepartie) for the realization of death, the minimal (and maximally available) 
consolation given the necessary causal separation of worlds.xviii 
Such minimal consolation, however, should not be confused with achieved 
redemption. Poetic language that points to absence in this way closes itself off from 
bridging with any sort of permanence the gap between what may or might be named 
(nommerai) and that which is being named. The radical affirmation of contradictoriness—
in the manner of someone like Nietzsche who praised the writer (and famously 
unsuccessful suicide) Chamfort as someone “who found laughter necessary as a cure 
against life, and who nearly considered himself lost every single day he passed without 
laughing”xix—is barred in the metaphysical design of Lewis’ worlds, but it surges up again 
in Roubaud’s elegiac poems at the very moment that these appear to adopt this 
philosophical perspective for consolatory purposes. With internal contradictions in each 
world ‘successfully’ prevented, the notion of a communicable paradox of simultaneous life 
and death within the same sphere cannot be cogently entertained. It can only be 
asserted in a conditional that strictly contradicts Lewis’ own tenets as we explored 
them above: 
si les mondes étaient des contes, leurs habitants des conteurs, 
 
et pas seulement leurs êtres mais tout, toutes choses, toutes 
 
racontant leurs histoires, racontées 
 
il y aurait place pour des mondes 
 
où des contradictoires seraient vrais 
 
où je dirais “tu vis, tu es morte” 
 
riant, tu répondrais   
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([xix], “La Voie du Conte,” La pluralité des 
mondes de Lewis 28) 
 
 
if worlds were stories, their inhabitants storytellers, 
 
not just the living beings, but all, all things, all 
 
telling their stories, all being told 
 
there would be room for worlds 
 
where contradictions could be true 
 
where I could say “you live, you’re dead” 
 
and with a laugh, you would reply   
    
([xix], “The Way of Stories,” The Plurality of 
Worlds of Lewis 29) 
 
Laughter in response to the contradictoriness of a world itself, fit to be invoked only in 
an impossible hypothetical, is not available in worlds governed by Lewis’ determination 
that they are not stories, only possible referents of the latter. The paradise of non-
contradictory possible worlds sketched out in philosophical discourse leaves it to poetry 
to articulate the impossible, that which is cast out and without title, that which does not 
fit the schema.  
This remainder even manifests itself, in all of its offensive contradictoriness, as 
printed externally on the page. The sixth of the 30 poems in the cycle was translated 
into English by Roubaud—a self-professed anglophile—himself; the French and English 
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versions are printed on facing pages in the original French edition, beginning with the 
following lines: 
 
Clean world, clean world, not deceptive, but absent 
if it is absent, it is nowhere, you are nowhere, and that’s that.   
 
([vi], La pluralité des mondes de Lewis 14;  
The Plurality of Worlds of Lewis 16) 
 
monde propre, propre, qui ne trompe pas, qui ne s’absente, 
et si absent, alors de nulle part; tu es nulle part, voilà tout.   
 
([vi a], La pluralité des mondes de Lewis 15) 
 
In an inverted echo of the “dirtiness” of the world of the lyrical I of Quelque chose noir in 
which life and death find themselves intermingled (“’Sale vie, sale vie mélangée à la 
mort” [“Méditation de la pluralité”; Quelque chose noir 80]), the cleanliness of the 
Lewisian metaphysical layout initially appears to provide welcome relief through the 
creation of well-ordered states of affairs, cleansed of the dirty bastardization of what 
does not belong to the same order. The disjunction, however, between the triple 
meaning of the French “propre” (signifying not only ‘clean’ but also ‘honest and ‘own’) 
and the streamlined English translation linguistically exposes the full existential 
contradictoriness of the situation: the possible world in which the dead other exists as 
living being is “clean” in that it does away with conceptual messiness, and it is “honest” 
(it does not philosophically deceive, giving its proponent “honest title” to it, as Lewis 
remarked), since its radical inaccessibility is fully acknowledged. Meanwhile, however, 
the “own world” (monde propre) of the lyrical I does not “absent itself” (in contrast to 
the “clean world” which the English text postulates as present rather than absent)—it 
persists at the very same time that possibilia are being entertained, making them into 
impossibilia, as the scenario of “Roman-Photo” also demonstrated. Thus, what at first 
glance looks like a more or less unproblematic carrying over of meaning from one 
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linguistic realm to another in fact opens up the ineradicable gulf of difference persisting 
between languages, and between the worlds to which these languages—given that they 
are not worlds—would refer. It is a demonstration of incommensurability in the guise of 
a translation, one which the English version of the book, The Plurality of Worlds of Lewis, 
could only have matched by reprinting poem (vi a) in the original French.xx Roubaud’s 
reader is confronted with two distinct poetic perspectives on possible worlds that each 
exist for themselves with the full positive force that this verb implies, but which, on the 
other hand, remain absent to each other, separated as they are on facing pages of the 
same book. 
The vexing way in which the question of translation bears on the question of 
(the impossibility of) transworld travel, counterpart relations, and communication 
indicates that the elegiac context of Roubaud’s poem cycles, while on the one hand very 
directly tied to the specificities of a personal life, ultimately reaches far beyond personal 
mourning in its implications. With this extension of perspective in mind, we may return 
once more to Lewis’ confrontation of the particular challenges that fiction poses for his 
metaphysical account. In the last of four postscripts to the reprint of “Truth in Fiction,” 
Lewis cites a fictional ballad, sung by a boastful singer portraying himself as the stockman 
Ugly Dave, capable of any number of amazing exploits and culminating in the hyperbole 
“In fact, I’m duke of every blasted thing” (Lewis, “Truth in Fiction” 279). The 
philosophical problem in dealing with a fictional song such as this, Lewis notes, is how to 
give an account of a singer pretending to be Ugly Dave, who in turn pretends to tell the 
truth about himself as an amazingly powerful stockman. How to distinguish, in other 
words, “pretending to pretend from really pretending” (280)? Although Lewis does not 
say so explicitly, this problem is far from merely presenting a tricky special case, and in 
fact goes to the very core of fictional discourse. As countless examples of complex 
fictional structures demonstrate, the “pretense”—that is: the invocation of a non-actual 
state of affairs—cannot necessarily be strictly isolated to one layer where it may be 
clearly distinguished from a discernible ‘reality’ of the instance engaging in the 
pretending. This is so because, in short, there can be impossible fictions.xxi  
Roubaud’s lyrical I may poetically invoke—or: ‘pretend the existence of’—a 
possible world in the poem “Roman, II” (in Quelque chose noir) in which the dead other 
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dials his number. He may likewise invoke a novel which narrates this situation, a state of 
affairs that is strictly impossible by Lewisian lights, and one which the lyrical I himself, as 
he acknowledges, “will not, in fact, truly be capable of imagining himself” (Quelque chose 
noir 54). How do we distinguish between the lyrical I pretending to pretend that the 
telephone might ring, and his pretending that it really might ring? How do we distinguish, 
that is, the lyrical I pretending to write (or star in) a novel pretending to narrate an 
impossible situation from him pretending to experience an impossible situation?  
To the extent that we recognize elegy to be an example of a fictional genre 
which by design runs up against the boundaries of pretense—the fictions to which we 
tend to resort in order not to contemplate death—we might not feel compelled to 
insist on any distinction at all. That is not to say that the drawing of a distinction makes 
no difference. Quite to the contrary, without its lyrical invocation of a “Photo-Novel” 
that does not, in the end, show anything, this poem would become a radically different 
text. It would not thereby, however, necessarily differ in its measurable proximity to an 
assumed world which was radically “honest” to the point of being devoid of any fiction 
or metaphor whatsoever.  
One noteworthy response to the Ugly Dave conundrum, given by Jim McKenzie 
in the context of a volume expressly dedicated to the memory of David Lewis in 2004, 
three years after Lewis’ death, amounts to a deflationary solution of the problem at 
hand in terms of genre:  
The genre into which this interpretation places the singer’s performance, 
the extravagant yarn, is common to many lands. . . . Only a listener with 
no appreciation of the point of the narrative could suppose that Ugly 
Dave was sincerely describing himself as a great stockman. . . . What 
Lewis fears, the collapse of the iteration, is prevented by the audience’s 
literary taste. Those who listen to ballads about stockmen need not have 
a highly cultivated appreciation of literary forms and genres, but there are 
some mistakes even they can avoid. (McKenzie 139)  
 
While the aesthetics of reception might well ensure the unproblematic enjoyment of 
Lewis’s fictional yarn among folk song aficionados (Lewis himself—no enemy of fictions, 
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popular or otherwise—was known to have great affection for the lore of the Australian 
bushlands), it seems less clear whether any undisputed genre features would without fail 
disambiguate the reinscription of modal realism into the genre of the contemporary 
elegy. Or, likewise, whether an encomium such as McKenzie’s own would not, in the 
end, have to be measured according to elegiac criteria as much as philosophical ones 
when it culminates in a conflation of Ugly Dave with the philosopher who brought him 
into existence, one bearing the same first name:  
Ugly Dave’s greatness lay not with an axe or a stockwhip, but with words 
and with his mind. He was a great storyteller and user of language. He 
could string together ideas in elaborate connections, in ways nobody else 
could have expected, enabling us to visualize things we had never dreamt 
of, and to think thoughts we had never thought before. He led us to 
understand what we could not otherwise even have conceived, as if he 
had a direct line to other and more fantastic worlds. (ibid.) 
 
The genre of “Ugly Dave’s” writings is here tilted from metaphysical analysis in the 
declarative mode over the edge that presumably separates truth-telling from pretense 
into the realm of storytelling. Even as he insisted that worlds are not stories, McKenzie 
implies, Lewis told stories about worlds. He helped visualize that which would not 
simply show itself of its own accord. He promoted an understanding of what, absent 
such storytelling, would have remained inconceivable. And he was able to do so, writes 
McKenzie in his own poetry of praise and lamentation, because it seemed as if Lewis had 
the very sort of communicative connection to another possible world that Roubaud 
contemplates in “Roman, II” in all its theoretical inconsistency—a telephone line which, 
if actually used, would have to transmit speech one could not possibly understand. If 
worlds were stories, Lewis could indeed have told them. But they are not. To the 
extent that it seeks to avoid becoming poetry, modal realism must reject this 
counterfactual. 
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i  See Doležel, Heterocosmica 231 n24. A good sense of the spread of disciplines 
involved in the discussion of possible worlds may be gained by perusing the volume 
Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts and Sciences edited by Allén. 
ii  See Pavel 49; Doležel, “Possible Worlds and Literary Fictions” 235. Even more 
skeptical concerning a straight transfer of the notion for the purposes of fictional theory 
is Schaeffer (207). 
iii  Pavel does avail himself of Lewis’ counterfactual analyses but rejects the 
metaphysical stance of modal realism as “an extreme position, which offends our most 
common intuitions” (Pavel 49)—an assessment which Lewis himself does not contest 
(Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds 133). Despite the remarkable range of Doležel’s 
Heterocosmica in its consideration of the relevance of possible worlds for narrative 
theory, the book declines to offer any perspective on modal realism, which may be why 
its author can flatly maintain at the outset that “[c]ontemporary thinking about possible 
worlds is not metaphysical” (Doležel, Heterocosmica 14). Marie-Laure Ryan, even though 
she takes Lewis’ position to imply a “counterintuitive view of actuality” that deprives the 
latter of its “uniqueness” (Ryan 18), nevertheless recognizes more value than most in 
modal realism for an analysis of fictional universes (23); it is not clear, however, to what 
extent the unambiguous ontological stand-off between Lewis and someone like Rescher, 
which she acknowledges, is resolved in her own account. 
iv  Bricker provides a helpful, non-technical summary of the main philosophical 
theses of Lewis’ book. 
v  Even though Lewis nowhere explicitly refers to Nelson Goodman’s later work, a 
negative echo of Goodman’s well-known book title, Ways of Worldmaking (1978), may 
be discerned here. Whereas Goodman seeks to develop a wide concept of reference 
that would surrender the so-called actual world for the benefit of all manner of sign-
dependent worlds (or ‘world versions’) such as those conceived in visual art, music, 
fiction, and science, Lewis is strictly opposed to any notion that would give semiotics a 
hand in creating worlds. 
vi  Another piece of contemporary literature that picks up on Lewis’ theory is the 
play Possible Worlds by the Canadian mathematician and playwright John Mighton (1992); 
see Klaver. 
vii  In his second Postscript to the text of the original article, Lewis proposes a so-
called “method of union” of maximally consistent fragments to deal with cases of 
internally inconsistent fictions; by relegating incompatible elements to separate “strands” 
of one fiction, an overall inconsistency of a given piece of fiction would be avoided, 
albeit at the considerable price of fragmenting a whole which once again stands to be 
united in logical terms. Richard Hanley expands and defends this line of argument, but 
his objections to the very notion of self-embedded fictions—which he rightly diagnoses 
as problematic both for Lewis and for his own defense of this view (Hanley 126)—seem 
far from conclusive. 
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viii  While the protracted scholarly debate surrounding the status of elegy as a genre 
is not of immediate relevance for the present context, it is worth noting Morton 
Bloomfield’s helpful characterization of elegy as a genre and the elegiac mode, 
respectively, as nested sets; he considers all elegies more narrowly defined to partake of 
the elegiac mode as a “mode of approaching reality” (Bloomfield 148), but not all poems 
in the latter mode to be elegies in the classical sense. The metrical form of Roubaud’s 
elegies is by no means classical, but their numerological constraints (see Montémont 
333-4) and form of personal address clearly tie them to the classical elegy tradition 
characterized by Bloomfield as “expressing both love and lamentation” (Bloomfield 149-
50). For sake of clarity I have slightly modified the existing translations of passages from 
Roubaud’s poems in the following; the page numbers of the published translations are 
provided for ease of reference. 
ix  See Klebes 158-61. 
x  See Wittgenstein, On Certainty.  
xi  Wittgenstein, Culture and Value 6-7. In his reading of Wittgenstein’s example of 
the Paris Urmeter (see Philosophical Investigations, §50), John Gibson succinctly explains in 
what way this sort of “right” perspective conflicts with the view that a philosophical 
realist such as Lewis might defend: “The point [for Wittgenstein] is, we are able to 
represent and refer to the world in speech because we use the world as a standard of 
representation and reference when speaking about the sundry objects we experience. 
And so when we want to illuminate the nature of the objects we talk about – what we 
are saying about the way the world is when we say that this is that sort of thing – we do 
not try to take a stab at the nature of the thing as it ‘really’ is apart from how we say it 
is. We come to our understanding of the reality of the things we talk about by reflecting 
on the story of how these bits of the world have been brought into and given shape by 
our way of life” (Gibson 57). 
xii Wittgenstein offers the poignant counterfactual: “If a lion could talk, we could 
not understand him” (Philosophical Investigations 223); it is in this sense that Roubaud’s 
fictonal scenario testifies to the impossibility of communication and understanding 
between inhabitants of incommensurable possible worlds. 
xiii  The ontological weight of this question may be measured against Quine’s thesis 
that “to be is to be within the range of reference of a pronoun” (Quine 13). 
xiv  On the metonymic substitutions of the name ‘Alix Cléo’ in Quelque chose noir, 
see Poucel 193. 
xv  See L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus, prop. 6.522. 
xvi  Another affinity between the literary work of the mathematician Roubaud and 
the metaphysics of the modal logician Lewis, which I will not explore here, is the central 
importance of set theory as a systematic template for both; regarding Roubaud’s ties to 
the set-theoretical Bourbaki project see Klebes 146-8. 
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xvii  Rosmarie Waldrop translates “Division of Worlds,” but use of the singular 
seems appropriate here since the ‘sub-worlds’ are pictured as emerging from a larger 
whole. 
xviii  In his study on mourning and elegy, William Watkin concisely notes that “death’s 
gap,” the radical absence denoted by elegy, “puts causality to death” (62). This fittingly 
explains why the causal isolation of Lewis’ possible worlds provides a compelling 
template for Roubaud’s elegies, but also why the notion of a seamless transfer of causal 
inference as it is employed in the actual world into fiction may present philosophical 
problems.  
xix  Nietzsche 126 (§95; my translation). 
xx  In the translated volume, poem (vi a) is omitted altogether while (vi) is reprinted 
as is from La pluralité des mondes de Lewis. The differences between the two poems can 
therefore be gleaned only from the original text. 
xxi  Doležel acknowledges these as limits to his narratological possible worlds 
project: “We have no satisfactory metalanguage for describing the semantic status of 
narrative worlds lacking authenticity: our thinking and our language are dominated by 
binary oppositions. Literary narratives proposing worlds without authenticity reveal the 
limitations of this binarism; they use and abuse the world-constructing force to question 
the universality and validity of our metalinguistic dichotomies. Self-voiding narratives 
simulate narrative texture but cannot bestow fictional existence, cannot affirm fictional 
facts. They subvert the very foundations of fiction making and create constructs 
suspended between fictional existence and nonexistence” (Doležel, Heterocosmica 163). 
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